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Marine altered its plans subsequent to the notice. Therefore, the
court concluded the district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction
over NRDC's citizen enforcement suit.
The court of appeals then considered another aspect of the district
court's subject matter jurisdiction-continuing violations. The Ninth
Circuit stated that a court has jurisdiction over citizen suits where a
plaintiff makes a good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent
violations. To establish a good-faith allegation, a plaintiff must prove
either that violations continued after the filing of a complaint or a
continuing likelihood of recurrence existed. Moreover, the court
explained that such violations were ongoing until no real likelihood of
repetition existed. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court
found Southwest Marine neither made inspections nor kept inspection
records. Also, the district court concluded Southwest Marine
maintained poor housekeeping during the action. As the district
court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the appellate court
upheld both the district court's determination that ongoing violations
occurred and its jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court of appeals found the district court's
injunction against Southwest Marine was proper. Southwest Marine
argued the injunction constituted an abuse of discretion because
requirements in the injunction were not contained in either the
permits or the plans. The court of appeals declared the district court
had broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief. While the district
court could enforce violated standards, it could not impose measures
that were either wholly unrelated to the violation or would override
the permit's terms. The court concluded the requirements imposed
by the district court were consistent with and complementary to the
existing requirements.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found the civil penalties imposed against
Southwest Marine were not excessive. The appellate court noted that
once a court concluded a CWA violation existed, civil penalties were
mandatory. Therefore, the district court properly considered the
offense's seriousness, the violation's benefits, any history of violations,
good faith efforts, and the possible effect of the penalty before it
imposed a fine of $1,000 per day of violation. The court also noted
that the district court found Southwest Marine could offset the penalty
by the cost of physical alterations. Because the civil penalty could be
zero, the Ninth Circuit concluded the penalties were not excessive.
Sara Wagers
United States v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 429 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding incidental or occasional fishing by an Indian tribe's
ancestors did not meet the "usual and accustomed" standard to
establish fishing rights under treaty provisions).
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In 1970, the United States and several western Washington Indian
Tribes sued the State of Washington and others. The plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce off-reservation fishing
rights the Indian tribes had reserved when they entered into treaties in
the mid-1850s. The dispute involved the area of Washington west of
the Cascade Mountains and north of the Columbia River drainage
area, including the American portion of the Puget Sound watershed,
the watersheds of the Olympic Peninsula north of the Grays Harbor
watershed, and the offshore waters adjacent to those areas. After an
extensive trial, in 1974 the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington adjudicated the treaty-reserved fishing rights of
several tribes in a lengthy opinion known as the Boldt Decision.
Subsequent to that decision, the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe
("Muckleshoot") sought to open commercial fisheries west of the City
of Seattle in an area of Puget Sound beyond Elliott Bay. In response,
the Puyallup, Suquamish, and Swinomish Indian tribes ("Tribes")
returned to district court in 1998 with a request for determination that
the Muckleshoot's usual and accustomed fishing area did not include
areas outside Elliott Bay according to the Boldt Decision. The district
court granted the Tribes' motion for summary judgment, limited the
Muckleshoot's usual and accustomed fishing area to Elliott Bay, and
enjoined the Muckleshoot from fishing the saltwater outside the bay.
The Muckleshoot appealed.
On appeal the case turned on Judge Boldt's finding that, prior to
and during the time the Muckleshoot's ancestors entered into the
Treaty of Point Elliott and Treaty of Medicine Creek, their usual and
accustomed fishing places were primarily in Duwamish drainage rivers
and "secondarily in the saltwater of Puget Sound." The Muckleshoot
argued the text was unambiguous, because "Puget Sound" has a wellunderstood, common geographical meaning. The Tribes countered
the phrase was ambiguous when examined in the context of the
evidence before Judge Boldt. The Tribes contended Judge Boldt
could not have intended to include the expansive area the
Muckleshoot claimed as part of their usual and accustomed fishing
waters.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court
that the broad term "Puget Sound" was at odds with the evidence in
the Boldt Decision record. The evidence included ethnographic data
and anthropological reports. From this evidence, the court concluded
the Muckleshoot were upriver people who primarily relied on
freshwater fishing for their livelihoods. Nothing in the evidence
indicated the Muckleshoot's ancestors had established any saltwater
fishing sites beyond Elliott Bay. The record did find the Muckleshoot's
ancestors engaged in some trolling for salmon when they descended
the rivers to get shellfish on the beaches. However, their descent was
restricted to the Duwamish River drainage, which empties only into
Elliott Bay, because the Puyallup Tribe had exclusive territorial rights
to river drainages leading to other parts of Puget Sound. Thus, any
excursions by the Muckleshoot's ancestors beyond the bay were
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incidental and occasional. Therefore, such activities did not meet the
"usual and accustomed" standard the Boldt Decision used
to
adjudicate fishing grounds under the provisions of the treaties. Based
on these findings, the appellate court affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the Tribes.
Kathryn S. Kanda

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Cmtys. for a Better Env't v. Tosco Ref. Co., No. C 00-0248, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1161 (N.D. Ca. Jan. 26, 2001) (holding environmental
organization's suit alleging Clean Water Act violations was moot
because National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit
violations could not reasonably have been expected to recur after
permit limits were revised and defendant sold refinery).
Tosco Refining Co. ("Tosco") owned and operated a refinery near
Martinez, California ("Avon refinery"). In 1993, Tosco obtained a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
from the California State Water Resources Board and the Regional
Water Quality Control Board ("Regional Board") in order to discharge
pollutants from the Avon refinery into the navigable waters of the San
Francisco Bay. The Regional Board amended the permit in 1995 and
again in February 2000, setting a limit for the allowable discharge of
dioxins to a monthly average of 0.14 picograms per liter ("pg/l"). On
June 21, 2000, the Regional Board again amended the effluent
limitations for dioxins, raising it to 0.65 pg/l. On August 31, 2000,
Tosco sold the Avon refinery to Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corp.
("Ultramar"), and transferred the refinery's NPDES permit.
Community for a Better Environment ("CBE") alleged Tosco
discharged dioxins from the Avon refinery at levels that exceeded 0.14
pg/l in violation of the NPDES permit and the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). CBE also asserted Tosco violated its dioxin monitoring,
sampling, and reporting requirements established by the permits.
Finally, CBE contended Tosco's dioxin emissions from the Avon
refinery smoke stacks violated the California Water Code, and that the
violations of the California Water Code and the CWA constituted an
unfair business practice in violation of the California Business and
Professions Code. Tosco filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting the June 21, 2000 amendment to the permit's dioxin effluent
limit and Tosco's sale of the Avon refinery eliminated Article III
subject matter jurisdiction and rendered CBE's suit moot. CBE filed a
cross motion for summary judgment.
The court determined Tosco bore the burden to establish CBE's
suit was moot by showing it was absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably recur. Tosco asserted it was absolutely

